Internet Exposure Test This Internet probe sends up to ten (10) UPnP Simple Service Discovery Protocol (SSDP) M-SEARCH UDP packets, one every half-second, to our visitor's current IPv4 address (10.1.1.1) in an attempt to solicit a response from any publicly exposed and listening UPnP SSDP service. The UPnP protocols were never designed to be exposed to the public Internet, and any Internet-facing equipment which does so should be considered defective, insecure, and unusable. Any such equipment should be disconnected immediately.
Is now being queried: |
THE EQUIPMENT AT THE TARGET IP ADDRESS DID RESPOND TO OUR UPnP PROBES! (That's probably not good!) |
The equipment responded with the following helpful (to malicious hackers) information about itself: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: max-age=120 EXT: Location: http://192.168.0.1:65535/rootDesc.xml Server: Linux/2.4.22-1.2115.nptl UPnP/1.0 miniupnpd/1.0 ST: upnp:rootdevice USN: uuid:add0d0d8-1dd1-11b2-a3c3-c36ac1b1c169::upnp:rootdevice |
The poorly designed Universal Plug n' Play (UPnP) technology, built into all consumer routers—and your router—was intended only to allow devices inside your network to request access by systems outside your network. It was never intended to allow anonymous hackers outside your network to gain access to systems inside your network . . . But when the router's UPnP services are unintentionally exposed to the public Internet—as we have just verified with your router—that's exactly what has happened. And because the Internet is being swept and scanned for exactly these sorts of mistakes, it's not a matter of “if” someone is going to start accessing and changing your router's settings, and using them to access your internal private network . . . but “when”.
If you can disable your equipment's WAN-side (the connection to the Internet) support for Universal Plug n'Play, you should do so immediately. (And then, of course, you can re-test here to verify that it was successful.) If your equipment doesn't allow you to selectively disable only WAN-side exposure, you should seriously consider disabling all support for UPnP until you have updated the equipment's firmware (if that's feasible), replaced its firmware with a more secure alternative (DD-WRT, Tomato, etc.), or replaced the equipment with a known-secure alternative.
PLEASE NOTE: “Exposure” is not synonymous with “vulnerability”, but neither is it good to be exposed. The response which you can see above often tells malicious hackers exactly what version of UPnP firmware you are running so that they'll know exactly how to attack.It's natural to wonder what other results might have been shown if your Internet equipment were different. So to satisfy that curiosity, here are three sample screens showing each of this test's three possible outcomes: |
|
Here's what you need to know about Universal Plug n' Play (UPnP):
The Security Now! podcast episode (#389) which immediately preceded the addition of this UPnP exposure testing facility, is available as a video on YouTube, or as downloadable high or low bandwidth audio. During that presentation, I explain to Leo and the podcast audience exactly what HD Moore and Rapid7 discovered during their comprehensive scanning the Internet during the second half of 2012, and I explain what it means for those whose Internet routers are exposing this privileged management interface:
|
Video starts at 0:09:44 |
Gibson Research Corporation is owned and operated by Steve Gibson. The contents of this page are Copyright (c) 2024 Gibson Research Corporation. SpinRite, ShieldsUP, NanoProbe, and any other indicated trademarks are registered trademarks of Gibson Research Corporation, Laguna Hills, CA, USA. GRC's web and customer privacy policy. |
Last Edit: Apr 09, 2013 at 10:37 (4,203.64 days ago) | Viewed 26 times per day |